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Abstract
This paper proposes a reform for school allocation procedures in order to help
integration policies reach their objective. For this purpose, we suggest the use of a
natural two-step mechanism. The (stable) first step is introduced as an adaptation
of the deferred-acceptance algorithm designed by Gale and Shapley (1962), when
students are divided into two groups. The (efficient) second step captures the idea
of exchanging places inherent to Gale’s Top Trading Cycle. This latter step could
be useful for Municipal School Boards when implementing some integration poli-
cies.
Keywords: Integration Policy, School Allocation, Affirmative Action.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, I28, J18.
I. Introduction
On March 6, 1961 President John F. Kennedy issued Executive Order 10925. This
can be seen as the beginning of a ‘new era’ against intolerance and discriminatory
practices. At that time, the way to fight against some of these ‘customs’ was by
promoting the use of affirmative action policies.
In a static setting, these policies can be seen as discriminatory practices; whereas,
from a dynamic perspective, the existence of a certain degree of ‘historical dis-
crimination’ justifies the use of affirmative action policies, as a necessary previous
step, before concentrating on avoiding discriminatory practices. In other words,
policies against circumstantial discrimination are useless if they are not accompa-
nied by measures to reduce structural inequalities.
Evidence suggests that the ‘long run’ arguments have prevailed, which is why,
for instance, the OECD countries explicitly implemented affirmative action mea-
sures to reach integration objectives. As a recent example concerning this matter,
let us mention the MENA-OECD conference on gender equality in government
and business, held in Paris on 4 May 2010.1 Other illustrative examples include
firstly, the presence of several policies to prevent gender gaps in terms of salary
and/or political representation and upon which legal reforms in some countries
are based; and secondly, the existence of intensive migration movements over re-
cent years that has justified the adoption of certain integration policies (from race,
ethnic and/or national origin perspectives).
1The conclusions from this conference are summarized in a document available at the OECD
web page.
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There is a controversial debate against affirmative action policies as some
agents believe that they are discriminatory practices. As an illustrative example,
we can mention that2
During the November 5, 1996 election, California voters voted
54% to 46% to amend the California Constitution through an initiative
commonly known as Proposition 209, or the California Civil Rights
Initiative. The proposition has been incorporated into the California
Constitution under Article 1, Section 31. Although the constitution-
ality of the initiative was legally challenged, the U.S. Supreme Court
denied further appeal and let stand the new California law on Novem-
ber 3, 1997. [. . . ]
Students and state lawmakers had urged the repeal, arguing that
the ban on “affirmative action" had caused the university to be per-
ceived as inhospitable to minority students. Proponents of the repeal
cited a sharp drop in the number of in-state black and Hispanic first-
year students and the hiring rates of women and underrepresented
minority faculty members.
The aim of the present paper is to shed some light onto the debate on affir-
mative action measures versus non-discriminatory practices. Our point is that, in
agreement with the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and also the Supreme Court’s opinion,3
2This quotation has been borrowed from the University of California at Irvine, Office of Equal
Opportunity and Diversity (OEOD). Website: http://www.oeod.uci.edu.
3See the arguments by Justice O’Connor on Grutter v. Bollinger, at the end of this Introduction.
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these policies should cease to exist when the effects of ‘historic discrimination
practices’ are dissipated. Therefore, it is important to concentrate on how these
‘everlasting’ inequalities could be reduced. In this sense, we believe that the ed-
ucational training of ‘future generations’ is one of the most relevant variables to
be taken into account, as whenever children have unequal opportunities to achieve
a comparable educational level, in the broadest sense, they will not be able to
compete fairly in the job market. Moreover, since
(a) there is empirical evidence to show the positive correlation between school
quality and housing prices in their ‘influence areas’ (see, for instance Kane
et al., 2006 or Dougherty et al., 2009), and
(b) one of the two main factors for a student to be attached to a certain school is
to reside in its ‘influence area’,
the main conclusion is that the non-application of affirmative action measures, in
favor of certain population groups, will lead to a more inequitable income distri-
bution in the long run.
This is why we concentrate on the analysis of school allocation procedures as
a way to reduce certain inter-group inequalities. We propose to introduce inte-
gration policies into the processes used for school allocation at elementary level.
To reach our objective we introduce a two-step procedure. For the first step, we
suggest a tentative allocation procedure with a minimal segregation level.4 The
4Frankel and Volij (2011) propose an exhaustive analysis for segregation indexes. Our ap-
proach differs from that of Frankel and Volij (2011) as our aim does not consider the different
districts into which each municipality is divided, but rather each municipality as a whole.
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second step adopts the idea of trading places, introduced by Alcalde and Romero-
Medina (2011b) to attain efficiency in the allocation process.
Concerning the first step, we proceed as follows. Each school is allocated a
number of available places, commonly known as its quota. We distribute each
school quota among the different groups of agents5 in such a way that (unless it is
impossible) each group has a number of ‘reserved places’ and, if we analyze how
many places have been assigned to each group, the share is equitable between
groups. Note that such a division allows one isolated school allocation problem to
be considered for each group. We then propose an initial distribution of its schools
places for each group satisfying ‘internal non-justified envy’.6 This objective is
reached by applying (a modified version of) the classical ‘deferred-acceptance
algorithm’ introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962), where offers are made by
students. This algorithm is applied to each group separately.
Once this first step is concluded, we can proceed to an ‘integrate’ second step,
whose main objective is to achieve improvements, in terms of efficiency, related
to the previous distribution. In this sense, we consider two different scenarios,
related to the Municipal School Board, MSB henceforth, objectives.
(a) Minimizing segregation is the main objective of the MSB. By this we mean
that the MSB would prefer to implement an inefficient allocation than ‘to
5Although our model, in Section III, deals with two-group problems, our results are straight-
forwardly extended to any number of population groups. What it is important is that the number of
available places at each school is high enough to distribute them among the groups by guaranteeing
some diversity representation at each school.
6The term non justified envy was coined by Abdulkadirog˘lu and Sönmez (2003) to re-interpret,
in the framework of school allocation, the classical notion of stability in matching problems.
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sacrifice’ the level of integration.
(b) The MSB objective is to obtain an efficient allocation; whilst minimizing
segregation is a secondary although relevant objective.
The two scenarios described above highlight the existence of some trade-offs
which are difficult to solve. The first incompatibility, referred to in situation (a)
above, concerns a trade-off between efficiency and non justified envy from an intra-
group perspective. This was pointed out by Alcalde and Romero-Medina (2011b),
showing that no procedure always proposes an allocation system that satisfies the
two properties above. Their solution was to propose an allocation procedure sat-
isfying non justified envy, in a weaker sense, and efficiency. The second trade-off,
proposed in statement (b) above, marks the incompatibility of global efficiency
and minimal segregation. Our suggestion to counteract this fact is to concentrate
on efficiency as the main objective and, then, select the efficient solution that
minimizes the segregation level. This approach is related to a controversy on in-
dividual versus collective rights. It seems to be clear that, from a social point of
view, segregation must be prevented. Sociologists and lawyers study the benefits
of integration from a social perspective7. Nevertheless, there are some popular
comments suggesting that certain groups are against integration. In this respect
van Buren (1995) says, on pg. 179,
Jews resist, for example any form of quotas for admission to pro-
7From a Sociological perspective, see the paper by Oliver (1985) for an old debate, or Curran
et al. (2006) for an analysis of migration and integration. Legal aspects are studied among others
in Seitles (1998) and Garda (2009).
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fessional schools, because they remember their own experience of
having been excluded by quotas in the past. Blacks, on the other
hand, demand “afirmative action,” knowing from their own past that
“open admission” in a white society has always meant black exclu-
sion. So blacks conclude that Jews are racists, and Jews conclude that
blacks are anti-Judaic. Their common experience of suffering only
serves to set them at odds.
Therefore, what we propose in affirmation (b) can be seen as a test to contrast
whether this ‘popular belief’ about others’ aversion to be integrated is empirically
sustained or not.
A further question that we wish to highlight in our proposal is legal imple-
mentability. In this sense, Gajendragadkar (2006) says:
[. . . ] racial balancing provisions, as governmental uses of race,
must survive the strictest judicial scrutiny to accord with the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Moreover, bearing in mind the case of Grutter v. Bollinger, and relative to the con-
troversial (long run) affirmative action policies versus (short run) non-discriminatory
practices, Justice O’Connor argued that race-conscious admissions policies must
be limited in time:
We take the Law School at its word that it would “like nothing
better than to find a race-neutral admissions formula” and will ter-
minate its race-conscious admissions program as soon as practicable.
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[. . . ] It has been 25 years since Justice Powell first approved the use
of race to further an interest in student body diversity in the context
of public higher education. Since that time, the number of minority
applicants with high grades and test scores has indeed increased. We
expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no
longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.
At this point, in order to avoid any misinterpretation, we want to stress that
by integration policies we are not necessarily meaning racial policies for integra-
tion. This term should be understood as widely as possible. For instance, some
policymakers could be interested in gender integration by reducing the structural
gap favoring men over women; others might well be interested in income-based
integration by helping children from low-income families to access high-income
district schools. What is important in this paper is that, once the policymakers
have decided which specific integration policy they are interested in, the popula-
tion is partitioned into mutually exclusive groups; and therefore, no agent is free to
decide which group she belongs to. In this way we avoid certain types of strategic
behavior.
II. Related Literature and Overview
The problem that we study here can be viewed as a many-to-one, two-sided match-
ing problem, following the original model by Gale and Shapley (1962). There is a
large tradition on this family of problems, as pointed out in the overview by Roth
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and Sotomayor (1990). These models have been used to study, both from a pos-
itive and a normative point of view, how several specific markets work or would
be redesigned. For instance, Roth and Xing (1994) identify the general class of
market failures due to the unraveling of appointment dates; Roth and Peranson
(1999) analyze some modifications introduced into the National Resident Match-
ing Program; and Niederle et al. (2008) overview some of the recent literature in
that matter.
For the case of school allocation, some recent papers explore the former Boston
system and propose modifications to reach a better allocative process (Abdulka-
dirog˘lu et al., 2005b, Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2006 or Ergin and Sönmez, 2006,
among others), whilst others suggest improvements to the current Boston system
(Alcalde and Romero-Medina, 2011b, or Kesten, 2010); the New York City sys-
tem for high schools has also been explored in some papers (see, for instance,
Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2005a) or Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2009).
Nevertheless, as far as we know, not many papers explore the school admis-
sion problem taking into account the possibility of affirmative action ingredients.
Abdulkadirog˘lu (2005) deals with college admissions, and considers that the col-
leges are the only agents that decide how their affirmative action policy should
be implemented, i.e. each school decides how to distribute its quota among the
different groups of agents. Then, he proposes a strategic analysis for the student
optimal stable matching mechanism. To the contrary, in the present paper, we
consider that schools do not have any capacity to influence the way in which their
places are ex-ante distributed among the different groups of agents. Our interest
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is not about global stability, as in Abdulkadirog˘lu (2005), but internal stability
plus inter-group fairness, which is not mentioned by this author. Moreover, our
analysis in the present paper does not concentrate on agents’ strategic behavior.
Recently, Kojima (2010) explores the possibility of proposing affirmative action
policies that do not hurt the disadvantaged students (in terms of efficiency). What
he finds is general impossibility of reaching such an objective. Meanwhile, Ehlers
(2010) studies a model closer to the one proposed in this paper. The main differ-
ence between the model in Ehlers (2010) and ours is that he considers that schools
places are ex-ante distributed among the two groups of agents and that this restric-
tion should be satisfied ex-post. However, our proposal does not require ex-post
distribution to satisfy any pre-established condition.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section III introduces the basic
model and discusses the notions of stability and efficiency from an intra-group
perspective. It also proposes a way to formalize the notion of the degree of ex-
ternal envy. Section IV introduces an algorithmic procedure yielding a matching
combining internal stability and external fairness. Moreover, the matching that
our procedure suggests is the unique second-best efficient allocation, restricted to
the two properties above. Section V explores two ways to improve the allocation
suggested in the previous section, in terms of efficiency. Each of these possibilities
for improvement follows one of the MSB objectives proposed in the Introduction.
The main objective for Section VI is to propose a value for the fairness param-
eter. We also suggest a method to evaluate the fairness degree of any matching.
Section VII introduces our main conclusions. Finally, the proofs are gathered in
9
the Appendices.
III. School Allocation Problem and Diversity. A Model
We consider a city with n schools. Let qi denote the set of available places for
new students that school ci has available, ci ∈ C = {c1, . . . , ci, . . . , cn}. Q =
(q1, . . . , qi, . . . , qn) is called the vector of quotas.
We also consider a group of m new students, m ≤ ∑ni=1 qi = q,8 each of
them belonging to one of the two mutually exclusive classes F and D, having
f and d individuals, respectively. For interpretative purposes, D is considered
the group of disadvantaged students (i.e., the set of agents that eventually benefit
from affirmative action policies), whereas F is referred as the group of favored
students.
Each student sj ∈ S = F ∪ D has a preference relation defined on the set of
schools. Let linear preorder Pj denote student sj’s preferences, andRi the induced
weak preferences.9 Similarly, we assume that each school has a linear preorder on
S that is interpreted as its priority list. Let Πi denote the priority list for school
ci.10 Vector P =
(
{Πi}ni=1 ; {Pj}mj=1
)
summarizing both school priorities and
student preferences will be called a profile of preferences.
8This assumption implies that there are enough places to allocate each student a place in some
school. Note that this requirement is not necessary to define a matching problem, and will not
be used in the description provided for some of our allocation procedures. Therefore, the only
reason we introduce such a consideration is the capacity for providing realistic interpretations in
agreement with the fact that compulsory schooling is established by law.
9i.e., given a student sj and two schools, ci and ch, ciRjch is interpreted as either ciPjch or
ci = ch.
10We do not discuss here how these lists are (or should be) built. The paper by Alcalde and
Romero-Medina (2011a) gives some insights on this matter.
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The problem that we would like to solve is how to distribute the students
among the available school places. A first approach to answer such a question
is given by the notion of matching.
Definition 1 Let SAP = {C,S,P, Q} be a School Allocation Problem. A match-
ing for SAP is a correspondence µ : C ∪ S  C ∪ S such that
(a) For each ci ∈ C, µ (ci) ⊆ S;
(b) For each sj ∈ S, µ (sj) ∈ C ∪ {sj};
(c) |µ (ci)| ≤ qi11 for each school ci; and
(d) For each school-student pair, (ci, sj), sj ∈ µ (ci) if, and only if, ci = µ (sj).
Among the set of matchings that a SAP admits, there are two particular re-
quirements that have been commonly asked to be satisfied by a solution in order
to be considered a satisfactory allocation. The first, called efficiency, implies that
students are unable to obtain a place each in a preferred school. The second, called
stability, establishes that student envies in the allocation process, if any, are based
on the way in which schools prioritize the students.12 Therefore, as far as the MSB
builds priority lists based on equity criteria, these envies could be considered as
unjustified. Definitions 2 and 3 formalize these ideas.
11Given a set A, |A| denotes its cardinal.
12The paper by Abdulkadirog˘lu and Sönmez (2003) proposes an interpretation of stability in
terms of absence of justified envy.
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Definition 2 Let SAP = {C,S,P, Q} be a School Allocation Problem, and µ a
matching for SAP . We say that µ is efficient if for any other matching µ′ 6= µ
there is a student, say sj , such that13 µ (sj)Pjµ′ (sj).
Definition 3 Let SAP = {C,S,P, Q} be a School Allocation Problem, and µ a
matching for SAP . We say that µ is stable if for each student sj and school ci
such that ciPjµ (sj), we have that
(a) |µ (ci)| = qi; and
(b) shΠisj for each sh ∈ µ (ci).
Any SAP whose students are divided into two groups, F and D, allows us to
consider two school allocation problems, namely SAPF and SAPD separately.
There can be described easily, once we have been able to disaggregate school
quotas by describing two vectors, QF and QD such that
(a) Q = QF +QD; and
(b)
∑n
i=1 q
F
i ≥ f ,
∑n
i=1 q
D
i ≥ d, where qFi
(
qDi , resp.
)
denotes the number of
places that school ci reserves for students in F (in D, resp.).
Given QF and QD we define SAPF = {C,F ,PF , QF} where the preference
profile PF =
({
ΠFi
}
ci∈C ,
{
PFj
}
sj∈F
)
agrees with P in the new set of agents, i.e.
(a) for each ci ∈ C, and any two students in F , say sj and sh, sjΠFi sh if and only
if sjΠish; and
13For the sake of simplicity, we consider in this paper that the to be unmatched option is worse
than to be matched to any school, i.e. ciPjsj for each student sj and school ci.
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(b) for each sj ∈ F , and any two schools, say ci and ck, ciPFj ck if and only if ck,
ciPjck.
SAPD, the school allocation problem that QD induces, involving schools and
students in D, can be described in a similar way.
Therefore, given a SAP and a matching µ, we can study how students in F
and D are located by µ, from an intra-group point of view, when considering
only students in any of the two classes. To reach our objective, for µ given, we
consider the disaggregate school quotas by defining for each school ci such that
qDi = |µ (ci) ∩ D|.14
Given vectors QF and QD described above, we denote by [µ]F and [µ]D the
matchings for SAPF and SAPD respectively that agree with µ, i.e. for each
ci ∈ C, [µ]F (ci) = µ (ci) ∩ F ; and, similarly [µ]D (ci) = µ (ci) ∩ D.
The above considerations are useful for introducing certain properties that a
matching might exhibit from an intra-group perspective.
Definition 4 Let SAP = {C,S,P, Q} be a School Allocation Problem, and µ a
matching for SAP . We say that
(a.1) µ is F-stable if [µ]F is stable for SAPF ;
(a.2) µ is D-stable if [µ]D is stable for SAPD;
(b) µ is G-stable if it is both F-stable and D-stable;
14Provided that agents in D benefit from the affirmative action policy, and that some of our
definitions are sensitive to the way in which excess places are distributed among both groups of
students, we might consider that these places are (ex-post) attributed to agents in F as a way to
compensate the effect of such a policy.
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(c.1) µ is F-efficient if [µ]F is efficient for SAPF ;
(c.2) µ is D-efficient if [µ]D is efficient for SAPD;
(d) µ is G-efficient if it is both F-efficient and D-efficient.
The next result, whose straightforward proof is omitted, reveals a close rela-
tionship between stability and G-stability; and a similar connection between effi-
ciency and G-efficiency.
Proposition 5 Let SAP = {C,S,P, Q} be a School Allocation Problem, and µ
a matching for such a problem. If µ is stable (resp. efficient), then it is G-stable
(resp. G-efficient). The converse is, in general, not true; i.e. G-stability does not
imply stability and G-efficiency does not guarantee efficiency either.
Note that the notions introduced in Definition 4 deal with internal stability
and/or efficiency for agents in any of the two groups, F andD. Nevertheless, they
do not consider any comparison involving students belonging to the two classes.
What we next propose is a way to evaluate external fairness, from the point of view
of the agents belonging to the same class. Related to this point, let us consider
that agents in a certain class assume that a proportion of places, say α, has to
be reserved for the students in the other category. Taking this premise as a fact,
the possibilities that a student might have to object to an allocation (based on the
priority lists) are reduced, related to what stability suggests.
Definition 6 Let SAP = {C,S,P, Q} be a School Allocation Problem, and α
and β, 0 ≤ α, β ≤ 1 two real numbers. We say that matching µ is
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(a) αF -fair, or α-fair fromF’s point of view if, and only if, for each school ci ∈ C,
if |D ∩ µ (ci)| > [αqi]+ , then {sh ∈ F : ciPhµ (sh)} = ∅.
(b) βD-fair, or β-fair fromD’s point of view if, and only if, for each school ci ∈ C,
if |F ∩ µ (ci)| > [βqi]− , then {sh ∈ D : ciPhµ (sh)} = ∅.
(c) α-fair if it is αF -fair and (1− α)-fair from D’s point of view;
where for a real number r, [r]+ is the integer v such that v − 1 < r ≤ v; and [r]−
is the integer z such that z ≤ r < z + 1.
Note that Definition 6 implicitly contains a flavor of ‘affirmative action pol-
icy’ benefiting agents in D. The first requirement that α-fairness suggests is that
agents in both sets agree how these places should be distributed, in relative terms.
The second assumption is that the fact that places are indivisible should not hurt
students in D. Just to illustrate this, let us consider two schools with 25 and 23
places respectively to be distributed. Let us assume that there is a consensus estab-
lishing that 70.83 % should be assigned to agents in F and the remaining 29.17
% correspond to students in D. Therefore, and provided that school places are
indivisible, students in D would be prioritized in 7 or 8 places at the first school
and 6 or 7 at the second. Since our aim is to promote affirmative action for these
students, we should consider that they have priority in 8 places at the first school
and 7 at the second.
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Continuing with the above illustrative example, we can proceed as follows.
Let us consider two independent SAPs, one involving the students in F , with
school quotas (17, 16), and the other including students in D, with school quotas
(8, 7), as previously argued. Now, let us assume that f = 34 and d = 14. Note
that any solution that we could propose should imply that one student in F must
have no school place and simultaneously one school has to have one unassigned
place. This proposal is hardly justifiable as a solution for our problem. The next
section deals with how to divide school quotas among the two groups of agents in
such a way that each student might be allocated a place.
IV. G-Stability and Inter-Group Fairness
The aim of this section is to propose a formal procedure showing the existence of
G-stable allocations. What we introduce here is a family of sequential procedures,
one for each parameter α used to distribute the school places among both groups
of students.
Just to introduce our next proposal, let Ω be the set of values for α guar-
anteeing that each student in D would be allocated a school place, i.e. Ω ={
α ∈ [0, 1] : d ≤∑ni=1 [αqi]+}
Definition 7 For α given, α ∈ Ω, we define the α-fair deferred-acceptance proce-
dure, that associates to each SAP = {C,S,P, Q} the matching µα, to be called
its α-fair matching, where
(a) for each sj ∈ D, µα (sj) is sj’s mate at the student optimal stable matching
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for
{C,D,PD, QD}, where the quota for school ci is qDi = [αqi]+; and
(b) for each sh ∈ F , µα (sh) is sh’s mate at the student optimal stable matching
for
{C,F ,PF , QF}, with qFi = qi − |{sj ∈ D : µα (sj) = ci}|.  
What the α-fair deferred-acceptance procedure suggests is the following. First,
let us consider the sub-problem involving disadvantaged students and a number
of school places guaranteeing that each D-student would be allocated a place at
a school. These places should be uniformly distributed across the schools. For
this sub-problem, let us apply the deferred-acceptance algorithm introduced by
Gale and Shapley (1962) in which students made the proposals. Then a new sub-
problem emerges. In such a case, the set of students coincides with F , and each
school still has available all the places that have been reserved for the favored stu-
dents, or no student in D previously applied for such a place. Now, let us apply
again the student optimal algorithm proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962) to this
second problem. Since no student belongs to both categories, i.e. F and D do not
intersect, the above description on how to allocate students among schools defines
a matching for the original problem.
The next result points out some of the properties satisfied by the matching
obtained when the α-fair deferred-acceptance procedure is applied.
Theorem 8 Let SAP be a school allocation problem and, for α given, α ∈ Ω,
let µα be the matching obtained by applying the α-fair deferred-acceptance pro-
cedure. Then µα satisfies the following properties
(a) µα is G-stable;
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(b) Each student is attached to a school, i.e. for each student sj , µα (sj) ∈ C;
(c) µα is α-fair; and
(d) No student has any incentive to misreport her preferences.
The above result shows that the outcome for the α-fair deferred-acceptance
procedure satisfies some interesting properties. Nevertheless, it can be far from
efficient, as the following situation illustrates. Let us consider a problem with
d = 50 and f = 100. Now let us imagine that there are 8 schools with 21
vacancies each, and fix α = 1/3. If c1 is the best school for all the students in D
and, similarly, it is the worst school for all the students in F , only 7 students in D
will obtain a place at school c1 and its remaining 14 places will stay vacant as no
student in F will apply for a place in such a school. Therefore, what this example
shows is that the matching proposed by the α-fair deferred-acceptance procedure
might be inefficient; and such an inefficiency, which is not present when students
are not segregated into two classes, can be reduced by reallocating the unassigned
school places.
A way to reduce the inefficiency of the allocation procedure is by introducing
what we call the multi-stage α-fair procedure. It can be described straightfor-
wardly by iteratively applying the procedure proposed in Definition 7. Let us
consider a given SAP . As a first tentative matching, we propose its α-fair match-
ing. We now investigate to determine whether there is any school with vacancy at
µα that has been over-demanded by agents in D. If there is no such school, the
process is over and µα is implemented. Otherwise, let us reconsider the share of
18
school quotas among the two groups, by increasing the quotas for agents inD, and
proceed in a way similar to the one proposed in Definition 7. This process ends
up when no school being under-demanded was over-demanded by disadvantaged
students.
Definition 9 For α given, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, we define the multi-stage α-fair proce-
dure which associates to each SAP the matching µmsα obtained throughout the
following algorithm.
(Step 1) Let µ1 be the matching described as follows
(a) For each sj ∈ D, µ1 (sj) is her student optimal stable matching for{C,D,PD, QD(1)}, where the quota for school ci is qD(1)i = [αqi]+;
and
(b) For each sh ∈ F , µ1 (sh) is her student optimal stable matching for{C,F ,PF , QF(1)}, with qF(1)i = qi − |{sj ∈ D : µ1 (sj) = ci}|.
If, for each school ci, |{sj ∈ D : µ1 (sj) = ci}| < qD(1)i , then the algorithm
stops proposing µmsα = µ1. Otherwise, go to Step 2.
(Step t) Let µt be the matching described as follows
(a) For each sj ∈ D, µt (sj) is her student optimal stable matching for{C,D,PD, QD(t)}, with qD(t)i = qi − |{sj ∈ F : µt−1 (sj) = ci}|; and
(b) For each sh ∈ F , µt (sh) is her student optimal stable matching for{C,F ,PF , QF(t)}, with qF(t)i = qi − |{sj ∈ D : µt (sj) = ci}|.
19
If µt ≡ µt−1, then the algorithm stops proposing µmsα = µt. Otherwise, go
to Step t+ 1.  
We would like to point out that Definition 7 assumes that α ∈ Ω, whereas Def-
inition 9 does not impose a lower bound for α. The only reason for introducing
such a formal difference is that this assumption is both necessary and sufficient for
the former to guarantee that each student will be assigned a place in a school, pro-
vided that there are enough places; nevertheless this lower bound is not necessary
for the latter to reach such an objective.
Let us observe that this algorithm is student monotonic, i.e. for two given steps
t and t′, t < t′, and each student sj we have that µt
′
(sj)Rjµ
t (sj). Therefore, a
natural question arises regarding the study of the restricted efficiency relative to
matching µmsα. Definition 10 introduces the notion of sub-optimality that we are
going to explore, and Theorem 11 points out that by applying the above mecha-
nism we always reach a sub-optimal allocation.
Definition 10 Let SAP = {C,S,P, Q} be a school allocation problem, and µ a
matching for such an instance. Given α, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, we say that µ is G-Stable
α-fair optimal for SAP whenever
(1) µ is G-Stable;
(2) µ is α-fair; and
(3) for any G-Stable matching µ′ 6= µ, such that |µ′ (ci) ∩ D| ≥ |µ (ci) ∩ D| for
each school ci, there is a student, say sj , such that µ (sj)Pjµ′ (sj).
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What the above notion for restricted optimality proposes is that we restrict our
analysis to matchings satisfying both G-stability and α-fairness. Moreover, since
integration is a relevant feature for the MSB policies, any alternative matching to
be considered should respect the integration level that the one proposed has. This
is the aim of the Condition (3) in Definition 10, which states that the presence of
students in D should be not reduced at any school.
Theorem 11 Let SAP = {C,S,P, Q} be a school allocation problem and, for α
given, µmsα be the outcome of the multi-stage α-fair procedure for SAP . Then
µmsα is a G-Stable α-fair optimal matching for SAP .
The next corollary points out that the complex sequentiality introduced in Def-
inition 9 is not present when the number of exceeding places is low enough.
Corollary 12 Let SAP = {C,S,P, Q} be a school allocation problem, withm =
q, and let α be a distribution parameter, α ∈ Ω. Then µα is a G-Stable α-fair
optimal matching for SAP .
V. Towards Efficiency
The main aim of this section is to explore how the MSB could act to improve the
allocation proposed by the multi-stage α-fair procedure, in terms of efficiency. As
anticipated in the Introduction, we distinguish two scenarios, depending on the
MSB objectives. Therefore, each possible objective for the MSB is analyzed in
an independent subsection.
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The solutions for both policies can be summarized in a simple way. Given
a SAP , and fixed α, let us compute its multi-stage α-fair matching, µmsα. An
interpretation of what this matching proposes can be established in terms of stu-
dents having usufruct right on their places, and thus they are free to exchange the
use of their places.15 Consequently, the allocation that µmsα proposes to each stu-
dent can be understood as her initial endowment to be exchanged (if she wished
to) in a market for school places. Based on this approach, what we propose here
is to apply Gale’s top trading cycle algorithm, introduced in Shapley and Scarf
(1974). For the MSB to reach its objective, it is important to decide how to use
the information about the students’ declared preferences for exchanging places.
To formalize this, we need to introduce additional notation. From now on, we
assume that each student, say sj , is endowed with a linear preorder Ej on S. For
student sj , shEjsk might be interpreted as, ceteris paribus, sj would prefer to
exchange her place with student sh rather than with sk.
The MSB role in this section can be summarized as follows: Given matching µ
for SAP = {C,S,P, Q} and students’ preferences for exchanging E = {Ej}mj=1,
the MSB determines, for each student sj , her MSB-agreeing preferences for ex-
change. Let Pj be the linear preorder in S that MSB associates to student sj
when, given the above primitives, it wants to implement policy P .
Given subset of students Ŝ, and sj , let B
(
sj; Ŝ
)
be the only Pj -maximal in
15Alcalde and Romero-Medina (2011b) propose a legal justification for such an interpretation.
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Ŝ. Similarly, for any two sets of students, say S¯ and Ŝ , we denote
B
(
S¯; Ŝ
)
=
⋃
sj∈S¯
B
(
sj; Ŝ
)
.
Before introducing matching µttc, in Definition 14, we need to formalize when
students are said to be involved in a minimal cycle.
Definition 13 Let S¯ and Ŝ be two groups of students, with ∅ 6= S¯ ⊆ Ŝ. We say
that S¯ forms a minimal cycle on Ŝ according to {Pj }mj=1 if, and only if,
(a) B
(
S¯; Ŝ
)
= S¯, and
(b) B
(
S ′; Ŝ
)
6= S ′, for each non-empty S ′ ( S¯.
Similarly, for a given set of students Ŝ, we say that sj is a Ŝ-cycle student if there
exists S ′, sj ∈ S ′ ⊆ Ŝ, such that S ′ forms a minimal cycle on Ŝ according to{Pj }mj=1.
Definition 14 Let SAP be a school allocation problem, and µ a matching for it.
Let us assume that each student is endowed with a linear preorder Pj in S , we
define its top trading cycle matching, denoted by µttc, as the solution for the next
iterative process.
(Step 1) Let S(C1) ⊆ S be the set of S-cycle students. Then, for each sj ∈ S(C1)
set µttc (sj) = µ (B (sj;S)). If S(C1) = S, matching µttc is implemented
and the process stops. Otherwise, let set S1 = S \ S(C1) and go to Step 2.
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(Step t) Let S(Ct) ⊆ St−1 be the set of St−1-cycle students. Then, for each
sj ∈ S(Ct) set µttc (sj) = µ (B (sj;St)). If S(Ct) = St, matching µttc,
as described trough steps 1 to t, is implemented and the process stops. Oth-
erwise, let set St = St−1 \ S(Ct) and go to Step t+ 1. 
A. Towards Partial Efficiency, without Increasing Segregation
This subsection deals with policy P1, the first possible objective for the MSB,
establishing that minimizing segregation is its main target. Therefore, once a
matching µ is socially supported because a distribution parameter α has been
agreed, any further modification that the MSB might propose should exhibit the
segregation level that µ does. To reach this objective, a simple way to proceed is
by restricting any alternative suggestion, say µ′, by imposing that, for each school
ci,
|µ (ci) ∩ F| = |µ′ (ci) ∩ F| , and |µ (ci) ∩ D| = |µ′ (ci) ∩ D| .
What we propose is to apply the next procedure. Given α, let us associate
each SAP with its multi-stage α-fair matching. Next, given µmsα and {Ej}mj=1,
let us consider MSB-agreeing preferences for exchange satisfying that,16 for each
sj ∈ D, and any two students sh and sk,
(a) If sh ∈ F , then sj P1j sh,
16Note that, since we do not impose how students in F are compared underP1j , our conditions
do not fully determine a specific preorder. In fact it is not necessary for our purposes.
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(b) If sh and sk are in D,
(i) If µmsα (sh) 6= µmsα (sk) then sh P1j sk if µmsα (sh)Pjµmsα (sk);
and
(ii) If µmsα (sh) = µmsα (sk) then sh P1j sk whenever shEjsk.
The description for students in F is made in a similar way, just by exchanging the
roles for F and D.
The main properties satisfied by this procedure might be summarized as fol-
lows.
Theorem 15 Given a school allocation problem, SAP , a distribution parameter,
α, and {Ej}mj=1, the students’ preferences for exchanging, let µmsα and µttc1 be
the matchings obtained by applying the multi-stage α-fair procedure and the top
trading cycle algorithm, according to preferences
{P1j }mj=1, respectively. Then,
(a) µttc1 is G-efficient;
(b) for each school ci, |µmsα (ci) ∩ F| = |µttc1 (ci) ∩ F|;
(c) for each school ci, |µmsα (ci) ∩ D| = |µttc1 (ci) ∩ D|; and
(d) for each student sj , µttc1 (sj)Rjµmsα (sj).
Let us note that statements (a) and (d) inform us that µttc1 is not only efficient
from each group point of view, but also that it is obtained by Pareto improving
matching µmsα. On the other hand, (b) and (c) establish that the transition from
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µmsα to µttc1 does not require any modification on the segregation level, measured
from the distribution of D-students among the schools.
B. Towards Global Efficiency and the Level of Segregation
This subsection deals with policy P2, the second possible objective proposed for
the MSB. It consists of obtaining an efficient allocation in which the level of
segregation is as low as possible.
To reach our aim we proceed following a similar structure to the one shown
in the previous subsection. Therefore, taking µmsα as given, we propose a way
to build MSB-agreeing preferences for exchanging that capture what policy P2
suggests. Then, once
{P2j }mj=1 has been specified, we apply Gale’s top trading
cycle algorithm to obtain what the MSB would propose, namely µttc2 .
Given student sj ∈ D, we define P2j as the preorder satisfying that, for each
two students sh and sk,
(a) If µmsα (sh)Pjµmsα (sk) then sh P2j sk; and
(b) Otherwise, i.e. if µmsα (sh) = µmsα (sk), then
(i) If sh ∈ D and sk ∈ F , then sh P2j sk;
(ii) If both sh and sk belong to the same group, D or F , and shEjsk, then
sh P2j sk.
For each student in F , say sj , preorder P2j is described in the same way as
above, just exchanging the roles of D and F .
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Our first result in this framework deals with the global stability for the alloca-
tion suggested by the MSB.
Theorem 16 Let SAP = {C,S,P, Q} be a school allocation problem, α a distri-
bution parameter, and {Ej}mj=1 the students’ preferences for exchanging. If µttc2 is
the matching that results from applying policy P2, then it is globally efficient, i.e.
for any other matching µ′ 6= µttc2 it should be sj ∈ S such that µttc2 (sj)Pjµ′ (sj).
We next deal with the analysis of situations where segregation can be a natural
property. To reach our objective, we need to introduce some additional concepts.
Definition 17 Let SAP = {C,S,P, Q} be a school allocation problem. We say
that CD, CD ⊂ C, is a group of D-schools if
(D.a) For each sj ∈ D, and any two schools ci ∈ CD and ck /∈ CD, ciPjck, and
(D.b) For each sh ∈ F , and any two schools ci ∈ CD and ck /∈ CD, ckPhci.
Similarly, we say that CF , CF ⊂ C, is a group of F-schools if
(F .a) For each sj ∈ F , and any two schools ci ∈ CF and ck /∈ CF , ciPjck, and
(F .b) For each sh ∈ D, and any two schools ci ∈ CF and ck /∈ CF , ckPhci.
Lemma 18 [Segregation Lemma]
Let SAP = {C,S,P, Q} be a school allocation problem. Let us assume that there
is a group of D-schools, say CD, such that
∑
ci∈CD
qi ≥ d,
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then for each distribution parameter α and any students’ preferences for exchang-
ing, {Ej}mj=1,
µttc2 (sj) ∈ CD,
for each D-student sj .
What the above Segregation Lemma points out can be seen as a first approach
to sufficient conditions guaranteeing that segregation is a natural consequence of
student characteristics. Let us observe that the above result can also be established
in terms of F-students, related to conditions for a group of F-schools, as assumed
in Lemma 19.
Lemma 19 Let SAP = {C,S,P, Q} be a school allocation problem. Let us
assume that there is a group of F-schools, say CF , such that
∑
ci∈CF
qi ≥ f,
then for each distribution parameter α and any student preferences for exchanging,
{Ej}mj=1,
µttc2 (sj) ∈ CF ,
for each student sj ∈ F .
As a direct consequence of Theorem 16 and Lemma 18, we can find a suffi-
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cient condition for segregation.
Theorem 20 [Segregation Theorem]
Let SAP = {C,S,P, Q} be a school allocation problem. Let us assume that there
is a group of D-schools, say CD, such that
∑
ci∈CD
qi ≥ d, and
q −
∑
ci∈CD
qi ≥ f,
then for each distribution parameter α and any student preferences for exchanging,
{Ej}mj=1,
µttc2 (sj) ∈ CD,
for each D-student sj , and
µttc2 (sh) /∈ CD
for any sh ∈ F .
Let us observe that, as long as students in D and F are treated symmetrically,
we can also establish a result similar to the Segregation Theorem 20, when condi-
tions are imposed on a group of F-schools.
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Theorem 21 Let SAP = {C,S,P, Q} be a school allocation problem. Let us
assume that there is a group of F-schools, say CF , such that
∑
ci∈CF
qi ≥ f , and
q −
∑
ci∈CF
qi ≥ d,
then for each distribution parameter α and any student preferences for exchanging,
{Ej}mj=1,
µttc2 (sj) ∈ CF ,
for each F-student sj , and
µttc2 (sh) /∈ CF
for any sh ∈ D.
We now proceed to give some insight on a condition guaranteeing the exis-
tence of a unique school, to be called a border school, where integration occurs.
Definition 22 Let SAP = {C,S,P, Q} be a school allocation problem. We say
that ci is a border school if there are two non-empty sets of schools, SF and SD
such that
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(a) CD is a group of D-schools,
(b) CF is a group of F-schools, and
(c) CF ∩ CD = {ci}
The next result provides sufficient conditions to have a unique school where
both types of students are allocated.
Theorem 23 Let SAP be a school allocation problem. Let us assume that ci is a
border school satisfying
q1 =
∑
ck∈C1
qk < d < qi + q
1, and q2 =
∑
ck∈C2
qk < f < qi + q
2,
where C1 (resp. C2) is the set of schools preferred by all the students in D (resp.
F), rather than ci. Then, for each α and any {Ej}mj=1, the matching µttc2 satisfies
(a) For each ck ∈ C1, µ (ck) ∩ F = ∅;
(b) For each ck ∈ C2, µ (ck) ⊆ F ; and
(c) |µ (ci) ∩ F| = f − q2, and |µ (ci) ∩ D| = d− q1.
VI. On α and the Degree of External Fairness
The aim of this section is to provide some insight on the determination of a rea-
sonable range for the value of α. As a first approach, let us suppose that q = f+d.
31
In such a case it seems reasonable to select
α =
d
f + d
,
as, with no historic discrimination, it could be considered that students would be
uniformly distributed around the city. Therefore, it might be expected that each
district has the same proportion of D-students, yielding our previous proposal.
Now, for a more general setting, when q ≥ f+d, and taking into consideration
that the dispersion of students among the districts is a consequence of previous
discrimination practices, students belonging to each group would propose
(a) From the point of view of F-students, agents in D should have priority as
regards, at most, d places, therefore the value for α should be
αF =
d
q
,
(b) From the D students viewpoint, there should be, at most, f places in which
students in F would have priority. Therefore, and in agreement with this
opinion, the value for α would be
αD =
q − f
q
,
Therefore, provided that there is a conflict of interest on how the extra-places
should be distributed between the students in both groups, it could be assumed
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that each α ∈ [αF , αD] can somehow be justified.
When evoking segregation in a particular school, what is argued is that the
ratio ofD-students in that school, related to the total number of accepted students,
differs from an ideal ratio. In our opinion, there are some relevant variables that
are not taken into account, such as the (potential) number of places, some of which
may be unoccupied. This is why we propose distinguishing two types of segrega-
tion, one for each reason that causes an unbalanced ratio
(a) F-segregation. This is related to the case in which the number of places
allocated to F-students is too large and thus the D students cannot be inte-
grated; and
(b) D-segregation. This occurs when the number of D students with a place is
too large enough and prevents integration for agents in F .
Definition 24 Let SAP be a school allocation problem, and µ a matching for
such an instance. We say that µ exhibits
(i) F-segregation at school ci if
qi − |µ (ci) ∩ F| < [αFqi]+ ;
(ii) D-segregation at school ci if
|µ (ci) ∩ D| > [αDqi]+ ; and
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(iii) Segregation at school ci if it exhibits F-segregation or D-segregation.
In accordance with Definition 24, given a school allocation problem, we can
describe the degree of segregation at school ci, associated to matching µ, as
∆ (ci;µ) =

|µ(ci)∩F|−[(1−αF )qi]−
qi
if |µ (ci) ∩ F| ≥ [(1− αF) qi]−
|µ(ci)∩D|−[αDqi]+
qi
if |µ (ci) ∩ D| > [αDqi]+
0 otherwise
The considerations above are useful to introduce a way to measure the degree
of segregation associated to a matching µ,
Definition 25 Let SAP be a school allocation problem, and µ a matching for
SAP . We define the degree of segregation associated to µ as the expected segre-
gation level for the set of schools,
Ψ (µ) =
n∑
i=1
qi
q
∆ (ci;µ) .
Our next result points out that the presence of a high segregation level can be a
consequence of some of the following factors
(1) The selection of an inappropriate value for α;
(2) The existence of a high number of exceeding places;
(3) The selected matching process.
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Theorem 26 Let SAP be a school allocation problem, withm = q, and let us as-
sume that there exists αˆ such that
∑n
i=1 [αˆqi]
+ = d. Then, the matching obtained
by applying the multi-stage αˆ-fair procedure, satisfies
Ψ
(
µmsαˆ
)
= 0.
Corollary 27 Let SAP be a school allocation problem, with m = q, and let us
assume that there exists αˆ such that
∑n
i=1 [αˆqi]
+ = d. Then, for any {Ej}mj=1,
the matching that results by implementing Policy P1, for distribution parameter
αˆ, satisfies
Ψ
(
µttc1
)
= 0.
To conclude this section, let us point out the general difficulty of guaranteeing
the possibility of always reaching a null value for the segregation level. As it is
usual in the (real life) description of school quotas, let us consider that there is a
number of places associated to each classroom, which is the same for all schools.
Let us assume that this number is 20 and, for the sake of simplicity, let us imagine
that there are 150 classrooms equally distributed in 50 schools, i.e. there are 50
schools with a quota of qi = 60 each. This means that 3000 new students can be
accepted.
Now, let us assume that we have exactly 3000 new students so that, as assumed
in Theorem 26, m = q, and they are distributed among the two categories where
d = 483 and f = 2517, i.e. 16.1% of students are in D and the remaining 83.9%
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belong toF . In such a case, there should not be αˆ satisfying the condition assumed
in Theorem 26. This is because the number of schools is even, and thus for each
α,
∑n
i=1 [αqi]
+ must be even too. Nevertheless, d is odd.
Provided that we must treat all schools in a symmetrical way, we should re-
serve (at least) 10 places forD-students in each school to give them the possibility
of having a place each. Let us observe that, for α′ = 0.161, [50α′]+ = 10. Now,
to evaluate the maximum possible value of Ψ, let us assume that all the students
show the same preferences, which satisfy
c1 Pj c2 . . . Pj ci Pj ci+1 . . . Pj c50 Pj sj
In such a case matching µmsα′ satisfies:
• ∣∣µmsα′ (ci) ∩ D∣∣ = 10 for each school ci ∈ C \ {c49, c50};
• ∣∣µmsα′ (c49) ∩ D∣∣ = 3;
• ∣∣µmsα′ (c50) ∩ D∣∣ = 0; and
• ∣∣µmsα′ (ci) ∩ F∣∣ = 60− ∣∣µmsα′ (ci) ∩ D∣∣, for each school ci.
Let us observe that this implies that ∆
(
ci;µ
msα′
)
= 0 for each ci /∈ {c49, c50};
∆
(
c49;µ
msα′
)
= 0.117; and ∆
(
c50;µ
msα′
)
= 0.167. Therefore, Ψ (µ′) = 0.006,
which is the minimal value for Ψ associated to this problem, whereas its maximal
value is 0.272.
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VII. Conclusions and Policy Suggestions
This paper aims to contribute to solving a social debate, namely the design of poli-
cies against segregation (or promoting integration). We concentrate on proposing
procedures for the distribution of primary school places, helping to reduce the
observed segregation level. This is the aim of the so-called multi-stage α-fair pro-
cedure, introduced in Section IV. We then deal with the possibility of improve-
ments, in terms of efficiency, for the above-mentioned allocation process. For this
purpose, we consider two different frameworks, each of them associated with a
different policy. The first policy deals with the case in which the level of inte-
gration cannot be waived. Therefore, the notion of efficiency should be adjusted
to each group of students separately. For the second policy, the efficiency level
should be global. Therefore, the (previously suggested) tentative matching allows
the disadvantaged students a chance to obtain a better school place, in comparison
with what they could obtain if the integration process was not implemented.
Finally, Section VI introduces a debate on how the integration level should be
evaluated. For this, according to Aristotle’s idea of potency, we consider that all
the places that have not been assigned to the favored students can be distributed
amongst the disadvantaged students as they wish. Therefore, in our opinion, the
relevant variable to be considered for evaluating whether a particular matching
procedure induces segregation is not the final outcome, based on the students’
desires. For us, it is the possibilities that the procedure itself provides to the
disadvantaged students, if they wished to be integrated, that should be taken into
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account.
To conclude we wish to layout some specific recommendations, related to a
question that the MSB should solve: How many places should be offered? One
could be tempted to answer by suggesting that as many as possible. Note that,
by setting qi = m for each school ci, we can guarantee that each student obtains
a place at her preferred school. Nevertheless, this option is neither possible, due
the large number of students, nor reasonable, due to the degree of overcrowding it
could induce. Imagine a small number of schools being the preferred option for all
the students! On the contrary, our recommendation is highly related to avoiding an
excessive offer of places, i.e. we propose to adjust, as far as possible, the number
of offered places to the students’ needs, thus equalizing school quotas,17 so that
for each school ci,
qi =
[m
n
]+
(1)
Then, since the number of excess places is low enough, when α is high enough and
students do not act strategically, the outcomes for the α-fair and the multi-stage α-
fair deferred-acceptance procedures should coincide. Therefore, given the above
school quotas, let us choose α = αD and apply the αD-fair deferred-acceptance
procedure. By Theorem 8 we know that students are expected to report their
true preferences. And, Theorem 26 informs us that the matching so implemented
17Our recommendation is made under the assumption that all the schools have the same number
of classrooms for the new students. Otherwise, expression (1) should be reconsidered by replacing
n for the total number of classrooms. In such a case, the ratio proposed in expression (1) would
reflect the quota for each classroom.
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induces maximal integration, i.e. Ψ (µαD) is close to zero. In a further step,
the MSB might be interested in applying either of the policies P1 or P2. Note
that, in such a case, the strategy-proof property might be lost. Moreover, if P2 is
implemented, the search for a higher efficiency could induce a lower integration
level, i.e. Ψ (µttc2) might be very high.
A further problem that has not been explored in this paper is related to the
need for me MSB to implement policies P1 or P2. Note that when q ' m the
multi-stage α-fair and the α-fair deferred-acceptance procedures coincide, for
α ∈ Ω. This implies that the multi-stage α-fair procedure satisfies, in such a
case, the properties proposed in theorems 8 and 11. In particular, students have
no reason to misreport their preferences. The introduction of policies P1 or P2
may provide students with an incentive to play strategically, and thus strategy-
proofness might be lost. A way to avoid such a problem can be found in how
schools build their priority lists. In particular, and following Proposition 5 in Al-
calde and Romero-Medina (2011a), we know that when schools rankings satisfy
the so called Common Priorities Condition, there exists a unique matching which
is stable and Pareto efficient. This allows policies for the MSB to be reconsidered
by redesigning how school rankings may be built, in order to avoid the implemen-
tation of policy P1 or P2 to reach optimality.
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APPENDIX
A. Proving Theorem 8
The aim of this appendix is to propose formal proof for Theorem 8. Let us remem-
ber that this statement informs about certain properties satisfied by the matching
µα, obtained by applying the α-fair deferred-acceptance procedure.
Let us observe that what this allocation procedure proposes is the following.
First, given a school allocation problem, SAP = {C,S,P, Q}, let us associate to
each school ci a number of reserved places for students in D, say di ≤ qi, such
that18
d ≤
n∑
i=1
di (A1)
18The assumption that α ∈ Ω induces the next condition, which is sufficient for all the properties
satisfied by µα except the one related to α-fairness.
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Then, we can consider the school allocation problem whose elements are
(i) The set of schools is C, where the quota for school ci is di; and its priority
list is ΠDi ; and
(ii) The set of students is D, where preferences for student sj ∈ D are Pj .
Let us compute the student optimal stable matching for such a problem. Then,
when the quotas for schools are induced by some α, as assumed in Theorem 8, for
each student in D, its mate at µα coincides with the student optimal matching for
the above problem.
Since for each student sj ∈ D, and any college ci, ciPjsj; each student is
admissible at any school; and, by condition (A1), the number of available places
is not lower than the number of students, we have that
(a) µα is D-stable;
(b) For each student sj ∈ D, µα (sj) ∈ C; and
(c) By Theorem 5 in Roth (1982), we have that truthful revelation is a dominant
strategy for all students in D.
The second step in the description of the α-fair deferred-acceptance procedure
lies in agents in F . In this step, given the previously determined allocation for the
D-students, {µα (sh)}sh∈D, the school allocation problem to be considered is the
following
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(i) The set of schools is C, where the quota for school ci, namely qFi , is
qFi = qi − |µα (ci) ∩ D| ;
and its priority list is ΠFi .
(ii) The set of students is F , where preferences for student sj ∈ F are Pj .
To complete the α-fair deferred-acceptance procedure, we apply the student
optimal stable mechanism to the previous problem. Let us observe that
(a) µα is F-stable;
(b)
∑n
i=1 q
F
i = q − d ≥ f . Moreover, students in F consider that any school
is preferred to not being allocated a place; and all schools consider that all
students are acceptable. Therefore, for each student sj ∈ F , µα (sj) ∈ C;
and
(c) By Theorem 5 in Roth (1982), we have that truthful revelation is a dominant
strategy for all students in F .
Now, let us observe that, for each α, α ∈ Ω, and any school ci,
|µα (ci) ∩ D| ≤ [αqi]+ ,
which implies that µα is αF -fair. To conclude, let us assume that, for some SAP
there is α yielding a matching µα which is not (1− α)-fair fromD’s point of view.
45
This implies that there is a student sj ∈ D and school ci such that ciPjµα (sj) and
|µα (ci) ∩ F| > [(1− α) qi]−
which is equivalent to
|µα (ci) ∩ D| < [αqi]+ ,
contradicting D-stability of µα. 
B. Proving Theorem 11
This appendix proposes formal proof for Theorem 11. To reach our objective,
we proceed as follows. Let SAP be a school allocation problem, and µmsα the
realization of the algorithm introduced in Definition 9. First, we see, in Lemma
A1, that µmsα is G-stable. Secondly, Lemma A2 establishes the α-fairness of
µmsα. Finally, through Lemma A3, we show that the optimality condition (3) in
Definition 10 is satisfied by µmsα.
Let us remember that µt denotes the (tentative) matching obtained at the end
of the t-th step of the multi-stage α-fair algorithm introduced in Definition 9.
Lemma A1 Let SAP be a school allocation problem and, for α ∈ [0, 1] given,
µmsα its multi-stage α-fair matching. Then µmsα is G-stable for SAP .
Proof
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Let us observe that, by Theorem 8, µ1 is α-fair and G-stable. Moreover, by con-
struction, at each step t, µt is also G-stable. Since there is some finite tˆ, at which
µtˆ = µmsα, the result follows. 
Lemma A2 Let SAP be a school allocation problem and, for α ∈ [0, 1] given,
µmsα its multi-stage α-fair matching. Then µmsα satisfies α-fairness.
Proof
To see that µmsα is α-fair, let us assume that, contrary to our conclusion, there is a
school allocation problem, SAP , and an α ∈ [0, 1] such that its multi-stage α-fair
matching, say µmsα, fails to be α-fair. This implies that there is a school ci and
student sj such that ciPjµmsα (sj) and
(a) If sj ∈ D, then
|µmsα (ci) ∩ F| > [(1− α) qi]− ; or
(b) If sj ∈ F , then
|µmsα (ci) ∩ D| > [αqi]+ .
We next show that none of the above situations could occur.
Let us assume that sj above is a student in F . Then µ1 should satisfy that
∣∣µ1 (ci) ∩ D∣∣ ≤ [αqi]+
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Therefore, there should be one step, say t, such that
∣∣µt (ci) ∩ F∣∣ < qi − ∣∣µt (ci) ∩ D∣∣ . (A2)
Let t0 be the lowest value of t for which condition (A2) holds.
Since the algorithm is student monotonic, this contradicts F-stability of µt0 .
This is because
(1) Since ci has a vacancy at stage t0, this would imply that µt
0
(sj)Pjci;
(2) By student monotonicity, µmsα (sj)Rjµt
0
(sj); then,
(3) By transitivity, µmsα (sj)Pjci.
Therefore, if µmsα is not α-fair, then sj should be a student in D. Then, since
(1) ciPjµ
msα (sj), by hypothesis, and
(2) µmsα (sj)Rjµ
1 (sj), by student monotonicity,
we have that transitivity implies that ciPjµ1 (sj). Therefore, since µ1 is G-stable,
we have that
∣∣µ1 (ci) ∩ F∣∣ ≤ [(1− α) qi]− .
Note that, since µmsα is not α-fair, there should be some step, say t, in which
∣∣µt (ci) ∩ F∣∣ > [(1− α) qi]− . (A3)
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Let t0 be the lowest value of t for which condition (A3) holds.
This implies that, at stage t0,
∣∣µt0 (ci) ∩ D∣∣ < [αqi]+ .
Then, G-stability of µt0 implies that µt0 (sj)Pjci. A contradiction. 
Lemma A3 Let µ′ be a G-stable matching for SAP , µ′ 6= µmsα, such that for all
sj ∈ S, µ′ (sj)Rjµmsα (sj). Then, there exists ci ∈ C such that
|µ′ (ci) ∩ D| < |µmsα (ci) ∩ D| . (A4)
Proof
Let µ′ be a matching satisfying the assumptions of Lemma A3. Let us assume that
condition (A4) does not hold. Then, for each school ci
|µ′ (ci) ∩ D| ≥ |µmsα (ci) ∩ D| . (A5)
Since each student sj will be allocated a place at some school, we have that
d =
∑
ci∈S
|µmsα (ci) ∩ D| ≤
∑
ci∈S
|µ′ (ci) ∩ D| . (A6)
Note that (A5) and (A6) together imply that, for each ci
|µ′ (ci) ∩ D| = |µmsα (ci) ∩ D| . (A7)
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Now, let tˆ be the last step in the multi-sequential α-fair deferred-acceptance
algorithm, i.e. tˆ is such that µtˆ = µmsα. In sub-step
(
tˆ.a
)
, when analyzing the
problem
{
C,D,PD, QD(tˆ)
}
, we have that, for each school ci,
q
D(tˆ)
i ≥ |µmsα (ci) ∩ D| = |µ′ (ci) ∩ D| .
Note that G-stability of both µmsα and µ′ implies stability of [µmsα]D and [µ′]D,
respectively, for
{
C,D,PD, QD(tˆ)
}
.
Given that [µmsα]D is the student-optimal stable matching for the problem{
C,D,PD, QD(tˆ)
}
, and [µ′]D Pareto dominates [µmsα]D, following Theorem 2 in
Roth (1982), we should conclude that [µmsα]D is D-unstable. A contradiction. 
C. Proving Results in Section V
The aim of this appendix is to provide formal proof for each of the main results in
Section V. To reach our objective, we will highlight the close relationship between
the processes described in this section, and ways to solve housing problems, in-
troduced by Shapley and Scarf (1974). The situation described in these problems
can be introduced as follows. A group of individuals, each owning an indivisi-
ble object, face the possibility of reallocating the objects according to their own
interests. The primitives for such problems are
• A set of m agents, A = {1, . . . , j, . . . ,m};
• A set of m objects, O = {o1, . . . , oj, . . . , om},19 and
19In this description object oj is usually interpreted as the initial endowment of agent j.
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• For each agent, say j, a transitive and complete binary relation on O, %j .
This is interpreted as j’s preferences on the set of objects.
According to our model, given a SAP and a matching µ, S can represent the
set of agents. Therefore, the set of objects can be identified with the set of person-
alized school places; i.e. for each student sj , oj = µ (sj). The element which is
still momentarily imprecise is how to describe students’ preferences. In general,
for a given student, say sj , %j might depend eventually on four factors, namely
(1) student preferences, Pj; (2) the initial matching, µ; (3) student preferences for
exchanging, Ej; and (4) the policy that the MSB wish to implement.
Proof of Theorem 15
Let us observe that, when policy P1 is implemented, the MSB-agreeing prefer-
ences for exchange imply that, for any two students, sj ∈ D and sh ∈ F , and any
initial matching µ,
µ (sj) j µ (sh) , and µ (sh) h µ (sj) (A8)
Taking into account Alcalde-Unzu and Molis (2011), Theorem 4, we have that
µttc1 should be efficient regarding preferences
{P1j }mj=1. Let us observe that
efficiency and condition (A8) imply that
(a) All the exchanges are intra-group; i.e., for each student sj , if when applying
the top trading cycle algorithm, sj ∈ S(Ct), then
B (sj;St) ∈ D if, and only if sj ∈ D;
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which implies that for each school ci,
|µmsα (ci) ∩ D| =
∣∣µttc1 (ci) ∩ D∣∣ ,
and
|µmsα (ci) ∩ F| =
∣∣µttc1 (ci) ∩ F∣∣ .
(b) [µttc1 ]
D is efficient for SAPD;
(c) [µttc1 ]
F is efficient for SAPF .
To conclude, let us assume that, for student sj , µttc1 (sj) is determined at stage
t. This implies that µttc1 (sj) = µmsα (B (sj;St)). Since sj ∈ St, we have that
µttc1 (sj)Riµ
msα (sj). 
Proof of Theorem 16
Let us observe that implementation of policy P1 by the MSB implies that the
reallocation of places for the two groups of students might be considered as an
isolated problem, as illustrated in condition (A8). Nevertheless, when policy P2
is implemented, it is not necessarily the case. Therefore, our result follows on
from Theorem 4 in Alcalde-Unzu and Molis (2011). 
Proof of Lemma 18
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Let us assume that there is a group of D-schools, say CD satisfying
∑
ci∈CD
qi ≥ d.
Since µmsα is G-stable, as shown in Theorem 11, we have that, for each sj ∈ D, if
µmsα (sj) /∈ CD, then it should be the case that |µmsα (ci)| = qi for each ci ∈ CD.
Moreover, by Theorem 16 we know that µttc2 must be efficient. This implies that
µ (sj) ∈ CD, for each sj ∈ D, yielding the desired result. 
Proof of Theorem 20
Note that, under our assumptions, by Lemma 18 we have that the students in D
should get a place at a D-school. Moreover, since
f ≤ q −
∑
ci∈CD
qi,
we have that C \ CD is a set of F-schools with enough places to allocate to all the
F-students. Therefore, since µttc2 has to be efficient, we have that
µttc2 (sj) ∈ C \ CD;
which is the desired result. 
Proof of Theorem 23
Let us observe that C1∪{ci} is a group ofD-schools. Therefore, by Lemma 18 we
have that no D-student would occupy a place in a school being in C2. Similarly,
53
we can see that C2 ∪ {ci} constitutes a group of F-schools. Thus, by Lemma 19,
we have that µttc2 (ck) ⊆ F , for each ck ∈ C2 ∪ {ci}.
On the other hand, since
∑
ck∈C1
qk < d < qi +
∑
ck∈C1
qk,
and µttc2 is efficient, we have that for each school ck ∈ C1,
∣∣µttc2 (ck) ∩ D∣∣ = ck,
which implies that
∣∣µttc2 (ci) ∩ D∣∣ = d− ∑
ck∈C1
qk.
A similar reasoning for students in F , related to colleges belonging to C2, informs
us that the number of F-students getting a place at ci is f − q2. 
D. Proving Theorem 26
To prove Theorem 26, let us observe that the existence of αˆ such that
n∑
i=1
[αˆqi]
+ = d, (A9)
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and the fact thatm = q imply that µmsαˆ = µαˆ, i.e. the multi-stage αˆ-fair algorithm
stops at its first step. This implies that, for each school, say ci,
∣∣µmsαˆ (ci) ∩ D∣∣ = [αˆqi]+ .
Moreover, since m = q, we have that, for each school, say ci,
∣∣µmsαˆ (ci)∣∣ = qi.
Therefore
qi −
∣∣µmsαˆ (ci) ∩ F∣∣ = ∣∣µmsαˆ (ci) ∩ D∣∣ = [αˆqi]+ ;
which is equivalent to establishing
∣∣µmsαˆ (ci) ∩ F∣∣ = [(1− αˆ) qi]− ,
which implies that, for each ci ∈ C, ∆
(
ci;µ
msαˆ
)
= 0. 
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